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Introduction 
The right to social security is readily presented in legal theory as an emblematic so-
cial right. It is proclaimed as a right in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the revised European Social Charter as well as a considerable 
number of national constitutions, both in and outside Europe. It exemplifies the specific 
nature of rights which require, in order for them to be exercised, a positive act by the 
public authorities, and which are more likely to form part of public policy than of actions 
brought before the courts on subjective rights. However, a different picture emerges if we 
examine the interpretation of the provisions of the International Covenant and the Euro-
pean Social Charter by the bodies originally interpreting them – the United Nations Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European Committee of Social 
Rights (ECSR) – and the abundant international, European and national jurisprudence re-
sulting from actions seeking to enforce these rights. The number and range of judgments 
on the right to social security lead to the need to re-examine the dogma of inadmissibility, 
which lies more within the realm of labour theory for legal professionals than reality.
The Greek Constitution first focussed on social security when it was enacted in 1975 
after the fall of the military dictatorship. It remains in force although it has been amended 
on a number of occasions. Article 22, paragraph 5 (originally paragraph 4 before the 
constitutional review of 2001) establishes that the State shall provide social security for 
all working people, as specified by law. The Greek legal doctrine presents it as either a 
“social right” based on this provision or an “institutional guarantee” prescribed by the 
Constitution in order to effectively guarantee social security for the population. This dif-
ference in terminology does not entail a substantive difference. Greek legal professionals 
unanimously recognize that the provision of article 22(5) of the Constitution does not lay 
down a justiciable right for individuals enforceable against the State for the purposes of 
obtaining a particular type of allowance for a particular length of time.1 However, Greek 
* This article has been previously published in The Right to Social Security in the Constitutions of the 
World. Broadening the Moral and Legal Space for Social Justice (ed. M. Wujczyk), Geneva 2016.
1  J. Iliopoulos-Strangas & G. Leventis, “La protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux dans l’ordre 
juridique de la Grèce”, in J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, La protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux dans les Etats 
membres de l’Union européenne, Nomos Verlag, 2000, p. 431
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jurisprudence does recognize that the constitutional provision imposes an obligation on 
the legislature to make law on social security matters in order to protect insurance funds 
and guarantee the development of the social security system.2 A claim by an individual 
to obtain social security benefits is “moderately” justiciable: it is receivable only if the 
State’s refusal to grant such benefits leads to unjustifiable discrimination or treatment that 
is manifestly arbitrary or unfair towards the individual.3 
The Greek legislature did not wait for constitutional recognition of the State’s obliga-
tion regarding social security in order to set up a social security system. The foundations 
of this system were laid down even before the Second World War. Nevertheless, it was 
only after the war and, in particular, its aftermath (i.e. the civil war from 1946–1949) 
that the State decided to create a national social security system based on the precepts of 
separation from the State and self-financing. The initial system was based on the fact that 
the insured parties were, at the time, young and larger in number than pensioners, which 
should have meant that contributions would accumulate to create significant resources 
and that pensions could easily be paid out of the system in the near- to medium-term. 
However, in the rather bleak economic situation of the 1960s and 1970s, the system 
was deprived of its potential to be independent and self-financed. Very high pensions 
granted to specific groups in society, workers registered in the system who were not pay-
ing contributions, and retirement at an early age, as well as factors such as falling birth 
rates, increased life expectancy and an ageing population resulted in all the contributions 
being used to pay for benefits and, over time, the contributions could no longer cover 
such benefits. Thus, the State was forced, in practical terms, to commit to guaranteeing 
the payment of pensions using public funds. Since the mid-1970s, financing the Greek 
social security system has essentially been entrusted to the State and has become a cog 
in the machinery of the State. Public policy administrators “traditionally” committed to 
clientelism and an underdeveloped bureaucracy were incapable of managing the capital 
of the insured parties in a financially profitable way for them.4 
The State’s positive obligation in the field of social security was enshrined in the 
Constitution in 1975, which coincided with the start of a lasting and deep crisis in the 
social security system (II). The overt failure of all attempts effectively and credibly to 
reform the system from the 1990s up to when the current financial and socio-economic 
crisis hit5 has legitimized the reform adjusted to the Greek bail-out under the leadership 
of the Troika (IV). This has, in turn, created new constraints relating to the sustainability 
of the system (V). Over the last 40 years, the legislature’s work regarding the imple-
mentation of obligations flowing from the Constitution was complemented by the work 
performed by the national courts, shaped – within the limits permitted by “moderate” 
justiciability concerning the right to social security as a social right – by the interpreta-
2  Council of State No. 2802/1991, Council of State No. 2677/1992.
3  Three-member Administrative Court of first instance of Athens no. 3330/2007.
4  For a brief analysis of the evolution of the Greek social security system, see D.A. Sotiropoulos, The 
social situation of Greece under the crisis. Basic socio-economic data, 2011, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
5  The repeated attempts to reform the Greek social security system are examined by K. Featherstone 
& D. Papadimitriou, The Limits of Europeanization. Reform Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece, 2008, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 121–170.
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tion of statutory law in the light of the Constitution (I) and the impact of constitutional 
guarantees of social security on the national legal system (III).
I. Constitutional guarantees of the right to social security 
Article 22(5) of the Constitution is not the only provision in the Constitution which is 
of interest in order to understand how the State came to guarantee the right to social se-
curity. Certain people, such as the elderly and people with disabilities, are at an objective 
disadvantage due to their situation. Social security acts as a protective measure for people 
in those types of situation, which are described in article 21(2), (3) and (6) of the Consti-
tution as an area in which specific measures must be taken by the State.6 It is possible to 
infer by reading all these provisions in conjunction with article 22(5) that the State has an 
obligation not only to implement a social security system for working people but also to 
contribute to financing it by allocating part of its budgetary revenue to it. It is precisely 
the latter obligation which was formalized in Act No. 2084/1992, which establishes that 
the State is to finance one third of the expenditure of social security bodies.7 
If the provisions of article 21(2), (3) and (6) are read together with article 22(5) of 
the Constitution, it is legitimate to think that, pursuant to the latter provision, compulsory 
social insurance must be exclusively entrusted to public bodies. Under the jurisprudence 
of the Greek supreme courts, whenever the law establishes primary and compulsory so-
cial insurance which is based on contributions from employers and employees, the State 
or a public corporation must be entrusted with the organization of the allocation of the 
benefits provided for.8 This does not mean that the Constitution prohibits social insur-
ance payments from benefit societies or private for-profit companies. These two types of 
undertakings offer optional pensions or other benefits, namely supplementary pensions 
from benefit societies (also referred to as the second pillar of the social security system, 
which is additional to the first pillar which covers compulsory and primary retirement 
pensions as discussed above) and complementary benefits from private for-profit com-
panies by means of contracts concluded with groups of individuals or the members of a 
particular branch of industry (this is the third pillar of the social security system). The 
establishment and activities of both types of social security entity are covered by article 
12(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right of Greek citizens to form non-profit 
associations and unions with regard to benefit societies, and article 5(1), which enshrines 
the freedom to choose with regard to private companies. Nevertheless, the Greek Su-
preme Court of Appeal has held that article 22(5) of the Constitution allows the legis-
lature to make law on social security in its entirety, without making a distinction as to 
6  Under article 21(2) of the Constitution, persons suffering from incurable bodily or mental ailments are 
entitled, among other categories of suffering people, to special care from the State. In accordance with article 
21(3), the State shall care for the health of its citizens and shall adopt special measures for the protection of the 
elderly and people with disabilities ; paragraph 6 of the same article stipulates that people with disabilities have 
the right to benefit from measures ensuring their self-sufficiency, professional integration and participation in 
the social, economic and political life of the country.
7  Act No. 2084 on the reform of the social security system, in Official Gazette (O.G.) No. 165/1992.
8  Council of State No. 5024/1987, Special Supreme Court No. 87/1997.
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whether it concerns the first, second or third pillar and even allow it to intervene in terms 
of establishing, amending or annulling the conditions originally agreed on in supplemen-
tary social insurance contracts or contracts that come under the third pillar.9 
The distinctive features of the Greek social security system, in the light of guiding 
principles of its organization, straddle a “Bismarckian” social insurance system and a 
“Beveridge” social protection system. The “Bismarckian” model is characterized by the 
range of its social security bodies, which are related to the various branches of industry 
and are financed by contributions. Notwithstanding the central role of the State with 
regard to financing these bodies, this was the prevalent social security model in Greece 
until fairly recently. It is clear that this type of structure, which covers all insured par-
ties, was likely to entail significant inequalities concerning the treatment they received 
depending on which branch of industry they belonged to. This susceptibility might be 
deemed difficult to reconcile with the requirement in article 21(3) of the Constitution, 
whereby the State is responsible for taking special measures for the elderly and people 
with disabilities, among others.10 However, the Council of State’s jurisprudence holds 
that entrusting social security to the multitude of bodies is justified by the different types 
of working conditions of the insured parties and is not incompatible with the principle of 
formal equality laid down in article 4(1) of the Constitution (“All Greeks are equal before 
the law”) or with article 22(5) of the Constitution.11 Bearing this in mind, the principle 
of equality is breached if similar groups of insured parties that are covered by the same 
social security body are treated unequally. In contrast, unequal treatment of parties in-
sured by different social security bodies will only be subject to penalties if the treatment 
guaranteed is not at least equivalent to that under social protection.12 
Even before the current crisis hit, upsetting public finances and the entire Greek 
economy, a public policy had been drafted aimed at a “shift” in the Greek social security 
system from the “Bismarckian” model to the “Beveridge” model. The latter (which owes 
its name to Lord William Henry Beveridge, the British economist and politician who 
instigated the establishment of a welfare system under the post-war Labour Government) 
is based on the fundamental principle of the State’s central management of the social 
security system, as well as the principles of financing the system using taxes, it being a 
single system and the uniformity and universality of benefits, which are intended to meet 
basic subsistence needs (hence the reason they are very low). 
This Greek public policy, outlined since the early 2000s, sought to merge the social 
security bodies whose resources had been badly managed with other bodies which were 
relatively stable and healthy.13 However, the Greek legislature did not consider it an ob-
ligation, in pursuing this policy, to strictly adhere to the constitutional commitment to 
the principle of equality (article 4(1) of the Constitution) read in conjunction with article 
 9  Supreme Court of Appeal No. 1638/1991.
10  See in extenso K. Chrysogonos, Civil and social rights [in Greek], 2nd edition, 2002, Athens-
Thessaloniki : Sakkoulas Publications, pp. 527–528.
11  Council of State No. 2805/1991.
12  Council of State No. 1461/1995.
13  See the detailed analysis of A. Stergiou, Social Security Law [in Greek], 2013, Thessaloniki: Zygos, 
pp. 138–143.
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22(5) of the Constitution. In the light of this, it was up to the Greek supreme courts to 
attach limitations to this policy. Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeal had already decided 
by the end of the 1980s that the need perceived by the State to maintain the financial 
stability of social security bodies was not a compelling reason to derogate from the ap-
plication of the principle of equality.14 The jurisprudence of the Greek supreme courts 
gave rise to a principle, whereby the legislature is only allowed to merge “homogenous” 
social security bodies, i.e. bodies that have the same organizational structure and whose 
financial sustainability is in fact similar. This principle was expressly formulated in a dis-
senting opinion on a Council of State judgment and has since been confirmed in Supreme 
Court judgments. It was held in this legal opinion that “a social security body, which is 
sustainable owing to the low level of benefits it offers its members, shall not be permit-
ted to make its members bear the financial cost of it merging with another body that has 
become insolvent due to it offering pensions that did not match its actual financial capac-
ity. As a general rule, national regulations concerning the unified treatment of insured 
parties, which does not take into account the financial health of each of the bodies to be 
merged, are incompatible with articles 4(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution”.15 To conclude 
the analysis, where social security bodies are merged, it is up to the legislature to decide 
to make up the deficit of certain bodies using public funds; it is not for the parties insured 
by the financially healthy entities.16 It is the legislature’s responsibility to raise, by means 
of public funds, the level of benefits guaranteed by a body that falls below the level of 
benefits offered by the other body, or to bridge the gap in terms of sustainability between 
the merging bodies.17 
II. The main features of the Greek social security system
In addition to the “Bismarckian” and “Beveridge” classifications of the Greek wel-
fare system, it shared, at least until the eve of the crisis at the end of the 2000s, the char-
acteristics of the welfare model developed in southern Europe, pairing serious gaps in the 
social security net and remarkably generous benefits reserved for a protected core of the 
labour market.18 
Pensions are the backbone of the Greek welfare system, providing households with 
24.1 per cent of their disposable income on average.19 Other social allowances (such as 
family support, healthcare benefits, housing benefits, unemployment benefits and social 
assistance) are minor and account, on average, for 3.2 per cent of the disposable income 
of households.20 Employees in the public sector (e.g. the civil service, judiciary and public 
14  Supreme Court of Appeal (Plenary session) No. 567/1986.
15  Council of State (Plenary session) No. 668/2012.
16  Court of Auditors, IV Section, Minutes of the Meeting No. 16/1.6.1999
17  Council of State (Plenary session) No. 92/2001.
18  M. Ferrera, “The Southern model of welfare in social Europe”, in Journal of European Social Policy 
6 (1), 1996, pp. 17–37.
19  See Survey of Income and Living Conditions 2008, Press release, 9.3.2010, Pireaus: Greek Statistical 
Service [in Greek].
20  Ibid. 
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corporations) and in liberal professions (e.g. lawyers, doctors, civil engineers and archi-
tects) were the policyholders who benefited most from the entitlements relating to social 
security. Employees in the private sector (excluding the banking sector) never benefitted 
from the same preferential treatment. On the whole, the parameters defining the actual 
content of social security entitlements varied considerably from case to case. For exam-
ple, the statutory retirement age for men ranged from 45 to 65 years for a full pension. 
The range was equally broad in terms of contribution levels, the minimum contribution 
period, reference earnings and replacement rates. The general picture was fairly complex 
and systematic differences between the entitlements of different groups of pensioners 
have been identified. In general, the rules governing pensions favoured self-employed 
workers more than salaried employees, employees in the public sector more than those in 
the private sector, middle-aged taxpayers more than young people, skilled workers more 
than unskilled workers, and men more than the majority of women.21
Unequal access to benefits was also the main characteristic of supplementary pen-
sions. The relevant social insurance schemes concerned around 62 per cent of all insured 
workers. Although coverage was practically universal in the civil service (and public 
corporations) and widespread among employees in the private sector (95 per cent), it was 
much more limited in the liberal professions (48 per cent), extremely low among self-
employed workers (two per cent), and almost non-existent among farmers. As the major-
ity of supplementary pension schemes were set up in the 1970s and had, therefore, not 
yet reached maturity, only 38 per cent of pensioners were, in practice, receiving a supple-
mentary pension in addition to their primary pension. The benefit levels have been strictly 
set and almost at random within each supplementary insurance body; they correspond to 
between 20 and 45 per cent of the final salary. In the last few years before the crisis hit, 
bearing in mind the number of people insured under supplementary pension schemes and 
of potential policyholders, all these funds were showing a deficit.22
The shortcomings in the social security net were also significant in terms of social 
benefits other than pensions. The contributory unemployment allowance instrument paid 
meagre benefits with a low replacement rate, for a short period of time and provided in-
complete coverage. Non-contributory unemployment benefit aimed at the long-term un-
employed over the age of 45 has not managed to play the significant role it was expected 
to when it was first introduced in 2001, mainly due to the strict eligibility rules. 
In addition, family allowances were only relevant to large families and unskilled 
workers. However, most families with one or two children received only a small al-
lowance if any, even if they were living in poverty. Public assistance for housing was 
limited. The public rental housing sector is underdeveloped and rent subsidies, subject 
to the resources statutorily provided for, available on a contributory basis, were not ac-
cessible for the poorest families. Short-term sickness or maternity benefits ranged from 
moderately generous (for skilled workers) to non-existent (for unskilled workers). Dis-
21  M. Matsaganis, “Union structures and pension outcomes in Greece”, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 45 (3), 2007, pp. 537–555.
22  See C. Leventi & M. Matsaganis, Distributional implications of the crisis in Greece in 2009–2012, 
Working Paper 14/13, Microsimulation Unit, University of Essex, available at https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/
publications/working-papers/euromod/em14–13.pdf
245The Right to Social Security in the European Constitutions: Greece
ability benefits were extremely fragmented with no less than ten different categories and 
22 sub-categories often unjustifiably treating the people concerned differently. Moreover, 
Greece is the only remaining Member State of the European Union which does not have 
a guaranteed minimum wage system, not even at the local or regional level (as is the case 
in Italy, Spain and Hungary), which could have acted as a social security safety net in the 
last resort. 
On the whole, because social benefits are heavily dependent on contributions, un-
skilled workers and their families, in particular, are denied their rights. The inherent risks 
of this situation have been fully exposed by the crisis when hundreds of thousands of 
workers lost their jobs and, consequently, access to social benefits for themselves and 
their dependants. 
III. The impact of the constitutional guarantees of social security  
on the domestic legal order
In the fragmented and unequal social security system operating in Greece until the 
crisis hit, it was not to be expected that the national courts, and more specifically the 
higher courts, take the same route as the high courts of other Member States of the Euro-
pean Union. That is to say, imposing on the States concerned the obligation to give effect 
to social security rights of individuals by means of positive measures, with a focus on 
ensuring that social security is adequate and accessible to all. In Greece, the State’s deep 
commitment to financing various social security bodies connected to different socio-pro-
fessional categories and integrating the social security system in the State’s clientelistic 
and paternalistic machinery,23 have been vectors of change in the system amid partisan 
antagonism, where competing groups sought to gain better treatment based on their lob-
bying and bargaining power.24 In these conditions, the basic constitutional rule, enshrined 
in article 22(5) of the Constitution, was the tool used by the national courts to lay down 
casuistically the principles which should have guided the legislature’s action in this area. 
Aside from the principle of equality which has already been discussed in the introduc-
tion and in the first section of this study, the matter concerns the principles governing the 
relationship between the level of contributions and the level of benefits, the participation 
of the insured parties in the administration of social security bodies and the insurance 
coverage for social risk and contingencies.
Based on the jurisprudence of the national and high courts, the abovementioned con-
stitutional provision does not, either literally or purposively, give rise to an obligation on 
the legislature to impose a contributory approach, at any cost, to social security contribu-
tions. In other words, the Constitution does not guarantee a fixed ratio between contribu-
tions and insurance benefits.25 Consequently, the Constitution does not require that the 
23  See above, in the Introduction.
24  For example, from the 1950s to 1980s, when the Greek government wanted to develop electrification 
and attract skilled labour, it preferred to grant benefits payable in kind either immediately, e.g. free electricity, 
or in the future, e.g. early retirement, rather than pay high wages it could not afford. However, it ends up pay-
ing these at some point, as well as the wages that increased over time.
25  Council of State No. 3251/1996.
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level of contributions be calculated on the same basis as that of benefits.26 However, it 
is compatible with the Constitution for the law to establish that beneficiaries insured for 
a longer period than those for a shorter period pay higher contributions in order to con-
solidate the resources needed for the social security body to meets its objectives.27 Moreo-
ver, the legislature is not prevented from reducing future pensions of certain categories of 
insured parties with an increased income (and, as a result, who have paid higher contribu-
tions than other parties), thereby making the economic burden to ensure the feasibility of 
the entire system heavier for them.28 
This jurisprudence, which monopolized the national courts’ concerns in the field of 
social security throughout the 1990s and 2000s, has been hailed in parts of the Greek 
social security doctrine as proof of the domestic legal system’s attachment to the role of 
redistributing national resources, which was traditionally the role of the social security 
branch; and even as proof of attachment to the principle of solidarity, which is at the other 
end of the spectrum to the contributory nature of contributions and helps to uphold and 
strengthen social cohesion.29 However the national courts have set limits as to the result-
ing, non-contributory nature of social insurance contributions. According to the Council 
of State, “although the legislature has complied with its obligations pursuant to article 
22(5) of the Constitution and the principle of equality (enshrined in article 4(1) of the 
Constitution), when establishing, for reasons of social solidarity, more favourable treat-
ment of financially disadvantaged insured parties as compared to financially powerful 
insured parties by imposing on the latter higher contribution rates or capping the benefits 
they will receive in the future, it is incompatible with the abovementioned constitutional 
provisions for a regulation to lay down that higher benefits be paid to the insured parties 
who have paid reduced contributions compared to those who have paid higher contribu-
tions for coverage of exactly the same risk.”30 
This jurisprudence of the Greek high courts seems to have started stabilizing in the 
late 1990s. However, this has not prevented the Greek Supreme Courts from establishing 
and promoting the principle whereby a legal cap on the social insurance benefits offered 
by a social security body is compatible under the Constitution provided that these ben-
efits, pursuant to the law which introduced them, do not have the distinct advantages of 
“pure contributory benefits”. According to jurisprudence, social benefits are not “purely” 
contributory if they have not been exclusively financed using beneficiaries’ contributions, 
and they have been supplemented by contributions from employers that are double the 
amount paid in by employees or have been financed using budget revenue or “essential 
26  Three-member Administrative Court of First Instance of Athens No. 7348/1998.
27  See the comments regarding the court decisions mentioned in the two previous footnotes of 
A. Stergiou, “The right to social security” [in Greek], Law Review of Social Security, No. 3/555, 2005, 
pp. 172–173.
28  Three-member Administrative Court of First Instance of Athens No. 7348/1998, Council of State 
No. 1807/2001.
29  See, for instance, G. Katrougalos, The Welfare State of the post-industrial era [in Greek], 1998, 
Athens: Savvalas Publications; A. Stergiou, “The constitutional protection of social security” [in Greek], The 
Constitution, 1994, pp. 66–100.
30  Council of State No. 4837/1997.
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contributions” made by third parties. In contrast, if the benefits are paid from the social 
security body’s capital, accumulated purely on the basis of withheld payroll and not of 
“social resources”, imposing a cap on such benefits would be incompatible with articles 
22(5) and 4(1) of the Constitution. This jurisprudence was introduced in a Special Su-
preme Court judgment of 1980; its approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal and 
the Council of State in the 1990s.31 
In addition, according to Greek constitutional doctrine, the participation of insured 
parties in the administration of social security bodies constitutes another principle that 
extends the effect, throughout the domestic legal system, of the relevant fundamental rule 
as contained in article 22(5) of the Constitution.32 However, the Council of State, in a 
decision handed down in the early 1990s, held that the government was not required, un-
der article 22(5) of the Constitution, to establish a majority representation of the insured 
parties in the administrative councils of social security bodies because the constitutional 
provision does not contain any indication as to the way in which these bodies, in their 
capacity as public legal persons, should be organized and managed.33 This judgment from 
the Greek Supreme Administrative Court seems rather unfortunate: in trying to define 
the principles which should govern the State’s involvement in the field of social security, 
the Court focused solely on article 25(5) of the Constitution, when in fact the State’s pre-
rogatives under article 22(5) of the Constitution should also be exercised in the light of 
other equally relevant constitutional principles and provisions. This includes article 5(1) 
of the Constitution which stipulates that “all persons shall have the right to participate 
in the social, economic and political life of the country”. This provision, when applied 
to the area of social security, would shed light on the requirement for the parties directly 
concerned (the insured parties) to participate in the administration of social security bod-
ies. Nevertheless, their participation would not be able to prevent the Government, whose 
political responsibility comes from Parliament, from managing the operations of these 
bodies. Consequently, a legal basis for a simple, rather than majority, representation in the 
administration of social security bodies of the parties concerned could have been article 
22(5) read together with article 5(1) of the Constitution. 
Lastly, another predominant principle concerning social security in the national legal 
system is that the coverage provided by the competent bodies should at least cover the 
main social security risks and contingencies; as for the jurisprudence, it emphasized that 
the “interest of the State and society” required “insofar as possible” universal, full insur-
ance coverage of the world of work.34 
31  See Special Supreme Court No. 9/1980, Supreme Court of Appeal (Plenary session) No. 32/1995, 
Council of State (Plenary session) No. 540/1999.
32  See, for instance, G. Leventis, “ The social rights of the citizen” [in Greek], The Constitution, 1976, 
pp. 174–175; K. Chrysogonos, see above fn. 10, pp. 533–534.
33  Council of State (Plenary session) No. 2692/1993.
34  Council of State (Plenary session) No. 832/1985.
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IV. Threats to social security rights and judicial responses in times of economic 
crisis
In the Member States of the European Union which have been affected by the finan-
cial and economic crisis, the measures adopted to deal with the crisis have significantly 
affected the welfare institutions. Changes have been made on two fronts. The first is 
budget consolidation, in other words reduced public deficits have deprived the welfare 
state of precious resources. The second is that the crisis has acted as a catalyst bringing 
about far-reaching and large-scale reforms. 
The social cost of the crisis has been particularly high in Greece. National revenue 
fell by almost a quarter. The gap between the standard of living in Greece and the rest of 
the European Union has returned to what it was 50 years ago. More than a quarter of the 
labour force is unemployed. The actual, average benefits for those in work are below the 
levels reached at the end of the 1990s. On the whole, the political response to the social 
consequences of the crisis has been misguided or inadequate. The reform of social wel-
fare has brought with it some welcome improvements, but most of the budget cuts were 
discriminatory and have caused significant problems and disruption to the health and 
social security systems. Despite the discourse of national politicians and international or-
ganizations on the need to strengthen the net of social protection, action to date can only 
be described as extremely disappointing. In the first three months of 2013, only one out 
of five unemployed workers was receiving unemployment benefits.35 
Although no cases have been brought, at least to date, before the Greek courts and tri-
bunals by individuals concerning the compatibility of the “anti-crisis” measures affecting 
the national social security system with the Constitution, the legality of these measures 
has been questioned in the light of the agreed European social security system, which was 
established in the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe and is monitored, to 
ensure compliance of States Parties to the Charter with the commitments to which they 
have subscribed, by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR).
In January 2012, five Greek pension federations submitted to the Committee under its 
quasi-judicial procedure of collective complaints,36 five complaints against Greece.37 The 
35  For a comprehensive analysis of the effects of the crisis on the social protection system, see 
M. Matsaganis, The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses, 2013, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
pp. 20–27.
36  The collective complaints procedure of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), is regarded 
unanimously by the European doctrine of human rights as a quasi judicial process, the first in international 
law specifically for economic and social rights; the practice of the ECSR in deciding collective complaints, 
reveals that the ECSR has developed considerable economic and social rights jurisprudence; it has articulated 
and elaborated on the values underlying the Charter; it has also employed techniques of reasoning drawn in 
part from the European Court of Human Rights. For a comprehensive analysis of the collective complaints 
procedure, see H. Cullen, “The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: Interpretative 
Methods of the European Committee of Social Rights”, Human Rights Law Review 9:1(2009), pp. 61–93.
37  See Federation of employed pensioners of Greece ((IKA –ETAM) v. Greece, collective complaint 
No. 76/2012, decision on the merits of 7 December 2012; Panhellenic Federation of Public Service Pensioners 
v. Greece, collective complaint No. 77/2012, decision on the merits of 7 December 2012; Pensioners’ Union 
of the Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways (I.S.A.P.) v. Greece, collective complaint No. 78/2012, decision on 
the merits of 7 December 2012; Panhellenic Federation of pensioners of the public electricity corporation 
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complaints concerned the package of measures passed by the Greek Government in 2010 
on pension rights: the variable reduction in proportion, but nevertheless significant, of the 
benefits from primary, supplementary and additional pensions; suspended pension pay-
ments or reduced payments where work was undertaken beyond a certain age; increased 
contributions to solidarity funds of pensioners; reduced “social solidarity” allowance 
paid to the lowest income pensioners in the private sector. The complainant organizations 
argued that the package of measures was contrary to article 12 of the European Social 
Charter in respect of social security.38 
Neither the complainant organizations nor the Greek Government have, in fact, de-
veloped very convincing arguments likely to be used as grounds for the finding of a 
breach or otherwise. The claimants have, in essence, stated that the measures – the im-
plementation of which was described by the government as being necessary to restore 
the balance of public accounts – were neither necessary nor suited to doing so. They 
argued that other, probably more effective, measures could have been proposed such 
as the development of public buildings; tax on capital, and on exchange and brokerage 
transactions; and the fight against tax fraud. The complainant organizations also relied on 
the European Court of Human Rights’ consistent jurisprudence, according to which the 
restrictions of rights protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the first Protocol thereto should not have been 
passed before checking that a proper balance was struck between the public interest and 
the protection of the rights of individuals, which was not the case in Greece, where no 
specific actuarial studies were carried out. 
Irrespective of the substantive debate, the complainant organizations also held that 
while article 31 of the Charter provides for restrictions and limitations to the rights set 
forth therein in certain cases (namely, with a view to protecting public order, national 
security, public health, or morals) and for restrictions and limitations which are not set 
forth in the body of the text, such restrictions and limitations must be prescribed by law, 
whereas the measures adopted by the Greek Government were not based on actual legis-
lation but on ambiguous legislative powers in the form of memoranda, conventions and 
agreements with the European Union. The fact is that the measures under review have 
( POS-DEI) v. Greece, collective complaint No. 79/2012, decision on the merits of 7 December 2012; 
Pensioner’s Union of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) v. Greece, collective complaint No. 80/2012, 
decision on the merits of 7 December 2012.
38  Article 12 of the European Social Charter : 
“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security, the Contracting Parties 
undertake: (1) to establish or maintain a system of social security; (2) to maintain the social security system at 
a satisfactory level at least equal to that required for ratification of International Labour Convention No. 102 
Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security; (3) to endeavour to raise progressively the system of 
social security to a higher level; (4) to take steps, by the conclusion of appropriate bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, or by other means, and subject to the conditions laid down in such agreements, in order to 
ensure: (a) equal treatment with their own nationals of the nationals of other Contracting Parties in respect 
of social security rights, including the retention of benefits arising out of social security legislation, whatever 
movements the persons protected may undertake between the territories of the Contracting Parties; (b) the 
granting, maintenance and resumption of social security rights by such means as the accumulation of insurance 
or employment periods completed under the legislation of each of the Contracting Parties”.
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been largely imposed on Greece by the Troika (i.e. the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). It is not all that far-fetched to 
think that, as a result, the ECSR held that there was no breach of the Charter. 
The high level mission of the International Labour Office did in fact, in its report of 
September 2011 on Greece, state that the level to which Greek pensions had fallen after 
the 2010 “laws” did not seem to be below that set by Convention No. 102 insofar as it is 
possible to assess this based on the first results of the actuarial studies available. How-
ever, it also reported that around 20 per cent of the Greek population was facing the risk 
of poverty, which it had not had the opportunity to discuss with the Troika. It also noted 
that under the circumstances there was scope to raise questions concerning the valid-
ity of maintaining the social security system. The reform package lead, moreover, to a 
significant extension of the minimum contributory period in order to obtain a retirement 
pension, including for women, without any other type of measure being introduced as 
compensation for women, children and young people. 
In this context, the ECSR was not able to examine the issue to find out whether the 
acts described as national “laws” were worthy of such a label, as it deemed that doing so 
was beyond the scope of its powers. Nevertheless, it generally concluded that the criti-
cized measures did breach article 12 of the Charter when read in conjunction with article 
31. It was not that the measures under review were not worthy of the label “laws” but 
rather that, contrary to the provisions of article 12 of the Charter aimed at ensuring States 
Parties endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level or 
at the very least maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level, they were not 
necessary in a democratic society for the preservation of public order, national security, 
public health, or morals and therefore were not covered by article 31 of the Charter.
The ECSR also stated that, regardless of the States’ margin of appreciation with re-
spect to balancing social security accounts, choices had to be made between various 
measures which either increased income or reduced the expenditure earmarked in those 
accounts. Every effort should be made for the choices to comply with the requirement 
to reconcile the public interest with the rights of individuals, including the legitimate 
expectations that may have arisen concerning the certainty of the applicable rules relat-
ing to social benefits, in particular pension rights, on the basis of which individuals have 
made contributions over the course of their career. This means that the choices made 
should not, contrary to both the principle that every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions set forth in the first Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the principle of legal certainty, result in depriving any 
person of such a substantial share of their means of subsistence as to seriously affect his 
or her living conditions, which instead of contributing to the protection of public order 
only represents a threat to him or her.
V. Assessment of the future of social security rights
On the domestic political scene, which has lost all credit because of the country’s 
compromised position in the hierarchy of developed countries as a result essentially of 
its economic and financial collapse, a debate is raging on the future of the Greek social 
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security system and its reform, which is crucial like never before. This debate is taking 
place in academic circles and civil society rather than in the national political system.39 It 
focuses on the following main points:
(a) A total end to contributions from employees and employers.
(b) The same pensions in terms of value and amount for men and women 
who work, granted by the State as soon as the individual has reached 
the fixed retirement age. No individual will be excluded from this ben-
efit. Given the universal nature of the benefit, the State’s obligation to 
take steps regarding social security, as required by the Constitution, 
will have been duly satisfied. 
(c) The pension granted by the State could be complemented by benefits 
which will be agreed on following collective bargaining between em-
ployees and employers. It could, optionally, be complemented by ben-
efits contracted for with private insurance companies. 
(d) Socio-professional groups will be free to organize pension funds, which 
may allocate supplementary pensions. The sustainability of these funds 
will not be guaranteed by the State. Existing supplementary pension 
funds could either continue while gradually becoming independent 
from the State or be dissolved. 
While the withdrawal of state funding to finance various social security bodies could 
easily be deemed incompatible with the principles of the welfare State, there is no deny-
ing that if it were to occur by means of a global reform of the system, it would be met 
with a certain degree of relief from the general public. The general public has been very 
disappointed with the chronic shortcomings of the system, as well as the injustices and 
the unequal treatment it has embodied for decades. Clearly such a reform cannot be made 
from one day to the next without transitional measures and deadlines. The real obstacle 
to this reform does not lie in the inability to create such measures and deadlines. It lies, 
by contrast, in the blatant lack of will on the part of Greek politicians to even consider 
such a reform, or even to engage in the dialogue and debate which is currently unfolding 
on the topic in civil society. Political responsibility concerning Greek governance policy 
on the impasse, in terms of the current social security system’s ability to meet its specific 
obligations, is the result of the irrational and disorganized management of the system 
pursued for so many years. For the Greek system of government, it seems to be enough to 
simply proclaim the growth of the country’s economy as the only way out of the endemic 
crisis. However, as has been rightly noted, domestic economic growth could be boosted 
by a reform of the pensions system, which would inter alia boost the private social insur-
ance market. It is highly likely that Greek politicians are waiting for the social security 
system to collapse in order to decide to rebuild it on a new foundation. However, if that 
happens it will lead to the collapse of the entire Greek economy and even of the political 
system itself. 
39  For an overview of this debate, see P. Vourloumis, “For a new system of social security”, The Athens 
Review of Books, December 2013, pp. 20–22; M. Xafa & P. Tinios, “What we choose for the social insurance 
system? One way to the depreciation or a new beginning?”, The Athens Review of Books, May 2014, pp. 11–14.
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Summary
In addition to the “Bismarckian” and “Beveridge” classifications of the Greek welfare system, it 
shared, at least until the eve of the crisis at the end of the 2000s, the characteristics of the welfare 
model developed in southern Europe, pairing serious gaps in the social security net and remarkably 
generous benefits reserved for a protected core of the labour market. The article describes in details 
constitutional grounds of Greek social security rights.
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